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A life of one hundred years packed with unprecedented influence on the
development of English law cannot be summed up in a conference of one
day or one paper of a few pages. Even restricting that influence to
administrative law leaves a task far too great to accomplish in this paper.]
Indeed, a major part of this paper could be taken up simply by listing the
areas in which judgments by Lord Denning remain vital to a proper
understanding of administrative law?
Thus I have decided on a different approach. I have selected four areas of
importance in which either through developments since Lord Denning's
retirement or otherwise the extent of his influence may be measured.3
Fortunately, there is only a little overlap between the areas which I have
chosen and those chosen by Professor Dawn Oliver in her article elsewhere
in this volume.4 The paper will then end with some more general remarks
about Lord Denning's role in the development of administrative law
including how it has been seen by others.
The areas which I have chosen in order to reveal the extent of his
influence are the following. First of all, we may consider the development
of the prerogative remedies starting with his "rediscovery" of certiorari for
error of law on the face of the record. Since, as we shall see, most errors of
• Robinson College, Cambridge; Assistant Director of the Centre for Public Law, University
of Cambridge.
I I take comfort from the fact that an excellent review of Lord Denning's influence in the area of
administrative law already exists in the form of Jeffrey Jowell's essay, "Administrative Law" in
Lord Denning: The Judge and the Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1984, ed. J.L. Jowell and J.P.W.E.
McAuslan). There is also a less sympathetic account by Eric Young entitled "Development of a
System of Administrative Law?" in Justice - Lord Denning and the Constitution (Gower, 1981,
ed. P. Robson and P. Watchman) which will be discussed below.
2 Jowell and McAuslan, supra n. 1 at p. x reveal that there are more than 2,000 reported cases in
which Lord Denning gave judgment.
3 Others might well choose different areas but I do not believe that different conclusions would
be reached.
4 "Lord Denning and The PubliclPrivate Divide" p.71 infra.
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law made by public authorities take the authorities outside their
jurisdiction, "error of law on the face of the record" is no longer of great
importance in controlling the activities of such bodies. But this too comes
about as a result of Lord Denning's work as will be explained below.
Secondly, we will look at Lord Denning's contribution to the law of
standing. As we shall see while Lord Denning has had his rebuffs in this
area the logic of his basic position - that the rule of law requires that no
decision should be beyond proper challenge and thus, where there is no
other proper challenger, standing will be extended to any ordinary citizen -
has very largely been accepted. Thirdly, we will consider the protection of
legitimate expectations which forms such a prominent part of the modem
law of natural justice. We will see that not only was Lord Denning
responsible largely alone for the introduction of this concept into English
law but his ideas remain vital to mark the limits of this doctrine in modem
law. Fourthly, and finally, we look at the juristic basis for the judicial
review of non-statutory bodies. We shall see that Lord Denning's ideas
have an important role to play in the development of this important facet of
judicial review.
II. ERROR OF LAW ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD AND
JURISDICTIONAL ERRORS OF LAW
May I commence with a very well worn quotation? In the first series of
Harnlyn Lectures given by Lord Denning and published in Freedom under
the Law he said:
"Our procedure for securing our personal freedom is efficient, but
our procedure for preventing abuse of power is not. Just as the pick
and shovel is no longer suitable for the winning of coal, so also the
procedure of mandamus, certiorari, and actions on the case are no
longer suitable for the winning of freedom in the new age. They must
be replaced by new and up to date machinery, by declarations,
injunctions and actions for negligence ...,,5
The challenge of these words has undQubted~ been met as the system of
administrative remedies we have today shows. And Lord Denning has,
inevitably, played a major part in meeting that challenge. But the
developments since Freedom under the Law are replete with at least two
curious ironies which is why this seems to be an area worth looking at.
First of all, it was Lord Denning himself who showed that there was life in
the prerogative remedies yet. This was in R. v. Northumberland
5 (Stevens & Co., 1949) at p.126.
6 Lord Denning, The Discipline of Law (Butterworths, 1979) at pp. 61-62.
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Compensation Appeal Tribunal ex parte. Shaw. 7 This was the case where
the Tribunal had made an error in determining the compensation due in law
to Shaw, a clerk who had been made redundant on the setting up of the
National Health Service. No other error had been made and the old adage
that "[i]f the tribunal had power to decide rightly, it had power to decide
wrongly" seemed to stand in the way of a correction. Lord Denning
disinterred the concept of "error of law on the face of the record" in
reliance upon 17th and 18th century cases;8 and applied it to ensure that the
correct compensation was paid. This concept of "error of law on the face
of the record" played an useful part in the development of judicial review
for some two decades. It provided a means where a legal erroneous
decision could be set right even where no error had been made taking the
decision-maker outside his jurisdiction.
However, in another ironic development it was then Lord Denning who
rendered the jurisdiction to quash for error of law on the face of the record
largely redundant by holding, in Pearlman v.Governors of Harrow School,
that:
"the distinction between an error which entails absence of
jurisdiction and an error made within jurisdiction is very
fine. So fine indeed that it is rapidly being eroded ....So fine
is the distinction that in truth the High Court has a choice
whether to interfere with an inferior court on a point of
law ...!would suggest that this distinction should now be
discarded. The High Court has, and should have,
jurisdiction to control the proceedings of inferior courts and
tribunals by way of judicial review. When they go wrong in
law, the High Court should have the power to set them
right. Not only in the instant case to do justice to the
complainant. But also to secure that all courts and tribunals,
when faced with the same point of law, should decide it in
9the same way."
Now although Lord Denning may have been wrong in extending this
principle to all inferior courts without qualification, his view has been
accepted as the orthodox position in English administrative law. 10
7 [1952] 1 K.B. 338.
8 Groenwelt v. Burwell (1700-)1 Salk. 144; I Ld. Raym. 454-469 and R. v. Glamorganshire
Inhabitants (1699)1 Salk. 146; 1 Ld. Raym. 580.
9 [1978] 3 W.L.R. 736 at 744.
10 R. v. Hull University Visitor ex parte Page [1993] A.C. 682 and Re Racal Communications
Ltd. [1981] A.C. 374. It should be pointed out that Lord Denning was not alone in collapsing the
distinction between errors of law within jurisdiction and without jurisdiction. Lord Diplock
being simply the most prominent of the other leading judges behind this development.
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Thus we see a consistent search for the extension of judicial review for
the sound reasons of policy given in the quotation above. Although it is
extended by rendering the jurisdiction to quash for error of law on the face
of the law redundant, it is done so on a principled basis.
III. STANDING AND THE VINDICATION OF THE RULE OF LAW
The tale of Lord Denning's contribution to the law of standing in the public
law is well known and told elsewhere. II But it is an excellent tale worthy of
brief repetition. Lord Denning's contribution in this area in linked to that of
Raymond Blackburn, that extraordinary litigator who in person, although
he had no particular interest in the matters in question, sought to prevent
illegalities by public authorities. Blackburn had the good fortune to
encounter Lord Denning on the bench to hear his cases.12 They were two of
a pair. Lord Denning certainly approved of Mr. Blackburn and Mr.
Blackburn thought Lord Denning was "the greatest living Englishman.,,13
There were in fact four reported Blackburn cases.14 Although Mr.
Blackburn was technically the loser in three of the cases, his intervention
brought about a beneficial change of policy by the Commissioner of the
Metropolitan Police in two of those three cases. Thus only one was a
complete defeat: that in which he sought to prevent the u.K. from signing
the Treaty of Rome! In none of these cases did Mr. Blackburn clearly
satisfy the criteria for standing for the remedy which was sought. But the
"greatest living litigator in person" and the "greatest living Englishman"
worked it out.
The nub of Lord Denning's reasoning on the issue of standing in such
11 Wade & Forsyth, Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, 7th ed. 1994) at pp.704 &
711-8.
12 Or perhaps more than good fortune, since Lord Denning was Master of the Rolls at the time.
13 The Times, 7th March, 1980. But Lord Denning mindful of recent defeats retorted: "Tell that
to the House of Lords."
14 Blackburn v. The Attorney-General [1971] 1 W.L.R. 1037 (declaration sought that H.M.G.
had no right to sign Treaty of Rome; denied as treaty making non-justiciable but Lord Denning
said "I would not myself rule him out on the ground that he has no standing."); R. v.
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn [1968] 2 Q.B. 118 (mandamus
sought to require Commissioner to enforce the law on gaming; relief refused because
Commissioner abandoned challenged policy on enforcement, applicant's standing left open); R.
v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn [1973] Q.B. 241 (mandamus
sought to require Commissioner to enforce the law on obscene publications; relief refused
because Commissioner increased number of officers in Obscene Publications Squad) and R. v.
Greater London Council ex parte Blackburn [1976] 1 W.L.R. 550 (prohibition sought to prevent
G.L.c. from using test of "obscenity" rather than "gross indecency" as required by law in
licensing film; prohibition granted; as a ratepayer the applicant (Mrs. Blackburn) had sufficient
standing).
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cases is to be found in the following dictum from the 1976 Blackburn case:
"I regard it as a matter of high constitutional principle that if
there is a good ground for supposing that a government
department or public authority is transgressing the law, or is
about to transgress it, in a way which offends or injures
thousands of Her Majesty's subjects, then anyone of those
offended or injured can draw it to the attention of the court
of law and seek to have the law enforced, and the courts in
their discretion can grant whatever remedy is
. ,,15appropnate.
These words though must be considered in the light of one of Lord
Denning's greatest defeats: Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers.16
Here it will be recalled that the House of Lords overruled Lord Denning's
finding in the Court of Appeal that the Attorney-General was not the "final
arbiter as to whether the [criminal] law should be enforced or not." Thus
where the Attorney refused leave to an individual (without any special
interest) to seek an injunction to prevent a breach of the criminal law , Lord
Denning Goined by Lawton and Ormrod L.JJ.) held "any citizen in the land
can come to the courts and ask that the law should be enforced." Although
the 1976 Blackburn case was concerned with the standing required for
prerogative relief and the Gouriet case was concerned with standing for an
injunction, the logic of Lord Denning's position is the same. The rule of
law is recognised as a fundamental constitutional principle, to which, if
necessary, other principles give way. Thus standing must be extended to
"any citizen in the land" if otherwise a decision would be unchallengeable.
Now while the Attorney-General seemingly remains beyond challenge, 17
Lord Denning's logic has triumphed. Even Lord Diplock - his restraint
minded "rival" if that is not too crass a way of putting it - concluded in
what is still the leading case on the requirement of "sufficient interest" to
bring an application for judicial review, R. v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small
Businesses Ltd., that:
"It would in my view be a grave lacuna in our system of public law if
a pressure group, like the federation, or even a single public-spirited
IS Ex parte Blackburn (1976) ibid at p.559 referring to his judgment in McWhirter's Case [1973]
Q.B. 629 at 649. These words were approved by Lord Diplock in R. v. Inland Revenue
Commissioners ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses [1982]
A.C. 617 at 644.
16 [1978] A.C. 435.
17 R. v. Solicitor General ex parte Taylor [1996] C.O.D. 91.
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taxpayer, were prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi
from bring the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the
rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped.,,18
Similarly in R. v. Secretary for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex
parte World Development Movement Ltd., where a non-partisan pressure
group that had campaigned for many years to improve the quality of
overseas aid given by the British government to underdeveloped countries
was found to have standing to challenge to challenge a decision by Her
Majesty's Government to grant aid for the construction of the Pergau Dam
in Malaysia.19 The court took into account the expertise of the applicant;
but was primarily moved by the fact that no one else would be able to bring
the challenge if the World Development Movement was excluded. This is,
of course, a vindication of the logic of the position that Lord Denning had
consistently adopted.
IV. THE INTRODUCTION OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
The concept of legitimate expectation lies at the cutting edge of
developments in the law of natural justice. Lord Denning both invented the
concept as far as English law is concerned and he gave the name
"legitimate expectations" to the similar, but not identical, principle that
operates in European Law. It is well known that in Schmidt v. The Home
Secretary Lord Denning, without any citation of authority, referred to
persons who had been granted leave to enter the U.K. for a certain period of
time having a "legitimate expectation" of being able to remain until the end
of that period and being entitled to a hearing if they were to be required to
leave before the expiry of that time.20
When I began to study legitimate expectations in the early 1980s I soon
became aware of the existence of a similar concept in the administrative
law of the European Communities and in other European countries. Was
this the same concept, or if it was a different concept, did both concepts
have a common origin? Was this perhaps an example of the transmigration
of ideas from European legal systems into English public law? The
judgment in Schmidt gave no guidance so I wrote to Lord Denning and
asked him.
An answer came back promptly. Lord Denning wished me and my
researches well but roundly scotched my thesis. He had thought up the idea
himself and certainly had not derived it from any European concept.21 What
\8 Supra n.15 in fact reversing the Court of Appeal [1980] Q.B. 407.
19 [1995] 1 W.L.R. 386
20 [1969] 2 Ch. 149.
2\ See 'The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations" (1988) 47 C.LI. 238.
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else could be expected from "the greatest living Englishman?" Curiously,
the phrase "legitimate expectation" was used after Schmidt in European law
to describe the concept in European law.22 So not only was Lord Denning
responsible for the concept in English law but he is also responsible for the
name in European law.
Interesting though this juristic archaeology is, what is its significance for
today's law? The concept of legitimate expectation forms a valuable and
prominent facet of the general and far-reaching duty to act fairly which
Lord Denning has done so much in other cases to develop. The doctrine of
legitimate expectation addresses the protection of the trust which citizens
have placed in statements or practices of those in authority. Citizens, to
whom solemn assurances have been made, who have placed their trust in
those promises of officials, should not find when that trust is betrayed that
the law can give them no remedy.
The point which I wish to pick up lies in the protection of substantive
legitimate expectations. An individual may through a promise of a
decision-maker23 legitimately expect either that a particular procedure will
be adopted in reaching the decision (this is a procedural expectation) or the
individual may expect a particular (and favourable) decision (this is a
substantive expectation). Now clearly procedural expectations are protected
simply by requiring that the promised procedure is followed. But what of
substantive expectations?
Although substantive protection has been recognised in several cases, it
sits awkwardly with the need not to fetter the decision-maker's discretion.
Decision-makers must be free to change their previously announced
policies and not be bound to follow them. For these reasons the most recent
cases suggest that substantive protection of legitimate expectations will
only be possible where the change of policy is shown to be irrational?4
There is force in these arguments; but should not the trust which has been
placed in the policy or undertaking of the decision-maker be protected in
some measure? The point that I wish to make is that Lord Denning had
already thought of this. In Schmidt, right at the introduction or invention of
the principle, Lord Denning said, speaking of the position of an alien who
had been given leave to enter and remain for a certain period:
22 Forsyth, ibid.
23 Or by that decision-maker's practice in adopting a particular practice or policy.
24 See R. v. Home Secretary ex parte Hargreaves [1997] 1 W.L.R. 906 (change in policy on
home leave for prisoners not irrational; challenge by prisoners whose first home leave had been
substantially delayed by change of policy failed); R. v.Inland Revenue Commissioners ex parte
Unilever ple [1996] S.T.C. 681 (decision by revenue to abandon practice followed for 20 years
of allowing taxpayer, because of the complexity of its affairs, to make claims for loss relief late
irrational and decision quashed). For comment see Forsyth, [1997] P.L. 375 and Bamforth,
(1997) 56 CLI. 1.
63
DENNING LAW JOURNAL
"If his permit is revoked before the time limit expires, he
ought...to be given an opportunity of making
representations: for he would have a legitimate expectation
of being allowed to stay for the permitted time.,,25
This is, of course, the recognition that a substantive expectation (of being
able to stay for a certain period) may be procedurally protected. This surely
is the way in which the protection of the trust placed in the undertakings of
the decision-maker may be protected while at the same time preserving the
freedom of action of the decision-maker. 26And it was an idea sprung fully
formed from the fertile brain of Lord Denning.
V. THE JURISTIC BASIS ON NON-STATUTORY REVIEW
One of the central conundrums of the theory of modem judicial review lies
in the failure of conventional theories - typically the doctrine of ultra
virei7 - to explain the judicial review of bodies which do not exercise
statutory powers. However, although the issue awaits authoritative judicial
consideration, a consensus seems to be developing that the juristic basis for
such judicial review lies in the idea that there is a common law principle
that monopoly powers should be exercised fairly and reasonably.28 Thus
one finds right from cases such as Faramus v. Film Artists Association
Lord Denning (here in the minority) placing reliance upon monopoly as the
factor indicating that power is not to be used unreasonably and unfairly.29
And in the leading case of Nagle v. Feilden the idea of controlling
monopoly power once more plays a leading ro1e.30This case, which was
heard in the days before legislation against sexual discrimination,
concerned the question whether the Jockey Club could adopt a policy of
denying training licences to women. But the Jockey Club enjoyed
monopoly control over organised racing in the United Kingdom. No one
could train racehorses successfully without a licence from the Club. This
meant that the Club had to exercise its powers fairly. Lord Denning now in
25 Supra n. 20 at p.171.
26 That such protection is possible and, indeed, appropriate is recognised in many cases. See, for
instance, Laws J. in R. v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Richmond upon Thames
L.B.C. [1994] 1 W.L.R. 74 at 920.
27 I should reveal that I consider that the conventional doctrine of ultra vires, properly
understood, is able to provide the constitutional basis for the judicial review of statutory
discretions. See, "Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: The Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of
Parliament and Judicial Review" (1996) 55 C.L.J. 122.
28 See Craig, Administrative Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed. 1994).
29 [1963] 2 Q.B. 527; [1964] A.C. 925.
30 [1966] 2 Q.B. 633.
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the majority (and clearly influenced by the monopoly position of the Club)
said this:
"If a man applies to join a social club and is black-balled, he
has no cause of action .... They [the members] can do as
they like ....But we are not considering a social club. We are
considering an association which exercises a virtual
monopoly in an important field of human activity. By
refusing or withdrawing a licence the stewards can put a
man put a man out of business ....The common law of
England has for centuries recognised that a man has a right
to work in his trade or profession without being unjustly
excluded from it. He is not to be shut out from it at the
whim of those having the governance of it.,,31
It is but a small step from recognising that there is a common law power to
regulate monopolies in regard to property and employment to the regulation
of procedural justice when such bodies exercise such powers. Reliance on
this common law principle justifies the judicial review of bodies that
exercise such powers.
R. v. The Panel on Takeover and Mergers ex parte Datafin was the
crucial case in recognising that there could be judicial review of bodies
which exercised neither statutory not prerogative powers.32 There it was
held that the Takeover Panel, which lacks any "authority de jure" yet
exercised great power in the regulation of takeovers of companies listed on
the London Stock Exchange, was, none the less, subject to judicial review.
The judgment of Lord Donaldson M.R. contains little principled discussion
of the proper constitutional or juristic basis of the jurisdiction that the court
was asserting. But that principled basis is surely to be found in Lord
Denning's common law principle of the regulation of monopolies. Thus
does Lord Denning profoundly influence a development that takes place
long after his retirement.
VI. OTHER VIEWS OF LORD DENNING
Professor lowell in his leading study ofthe influence of Lord Denning
draws the distinction between an "activist model" and a "restraint model"
ofthe judicial process in administrative law. His prime conclusion is that
Lord Denning adopted the "activist model" and "with Lord Reid in
particular, succeeded in challenging the ...'restraint model' espoused by
other leading and persuasive judges (especially Lord Diplock). The
31 Ibid at p.644.
32 [1987] Q.B. 815 (C.A.).
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development of an activist administrative law is surely one of Lord
Denning's great contributions.,,33 Anyone with even a nodding
acquaintance with the modem administrative law of England will recognise
that this conclusion is amply justified.
But it does not follow that everyone is content with this state of affairs or
welcomes an "activist administrative law." Consider the view of Eric
Young who in his study of Lord Denning and administrative law concludes
that:
''Lord Denning's influence on administrative law has, it is
submitted, been very considerable. He has been a major
force in widening the scope for judicial intervention in
relation to the activities of administrative bodies. As a
result, however, of the increased discretion which the courts
have taken to themselves, it has become more and more
difficult to predict when and how judicial control will be
exercised. Little progress has been made towards a
developed system of administrative law ....Arbitrary
exercises of judicial power do not provide an answer to
arbitrary exercises of executive power. Whatever the
inadequacies ...of present methods of political control over
administrative bodies, the move, under the influence of
Lord Denning, towards giving the judges an unfettered
discretion to decide when and how to intervene in
administrative action does not represent a satisfactory
solution to the question of how to control the activities of
public authorities. ,,34
Is it the case that Lord Denning prevented the creation of a modem system
of administrative law by the inconsistency of his decisions? That he while
challenging the arbitrary power of the decision-makers in fact he replaced it
with the arbitrary power of the judiciary? This is a fundamental charge to
which a clear answer must needs be given. Let me commence the answer to
that charge by making two inevitable concessions.
First of all, there are inconsistencies in Lord Denning's decisions. He has
not always said the same thing. For instance, to give but one example, on
the vital but technical issue of the voidness of unlawful administrative acts
he has vacillated; although he eventually reached and stands by the right
conclusion?S But is some inconsistency not inevitable in the course of a
33 In his "Administrative Law" in 1. L. lowell and 1. P.W.B. McAuslan, supra n.l at p.209.
34 Young, supra n.l at p.180.
35 In Finnan v. Ellis [1978] 3 W.L.R. 1 Lord Denning accepted that unlawful administrative
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long judicial career? And it is not noteworthy that Lord Denning has been
willing to recognise the error of his ways. Not for him the arrogance of
judicial infallibility.
Secondly, Lord Denning's moral and political views have sometimes not
chimed with the tenor of our own day. Great fun mal. be had by the critics
with cases such as Ward v. Bradford Corporation.3 This was the case of
the trainee teacher, a woman, who had been found to have a man in her
room contrary to the rules of the hall of residence. The procedure whereby
she was thereafter expelled from the college reeks of moral outrage rather
than procedural propriety. The disciplinary rules were changed
retrospectively, there were reasonable grounds to suspect bias by the
authorities, etc etc. Lord Denning was fIrmly on the side of moral outrage.
He said:
"Instead of going into lodgings she had this man with her,
night after night, in the hall of residence where such a thing
was absolutely forbidden. That is a fIne example to set to
others. And she a girl training to be a teacher! I expect the
governors and the staff all thought she was quite an
unsuitable person for it. She would never make a teacher.
No parent would knowingly entrust their child to her
care.,,37
But in explanation rather than defence of such statements it should be
taken into account that Lord Denning was born into a different world.
Victoria was still on the throne. He was called to the bar in 1923. Surely, it
is inevitable, given the vast changes wrought in public attitudes and public
morality in the course ofthe many decades since Lord Denning's moral and
political ideas were set, that some of his views should bear an out-of-date
air. Many would see this as a strength. The only flaw was to allow those
views to overwhelm the case for treating Miss. Ward fairly. But remember
that there are more than 2,000 reported cases in which Lord Denning gave
judgment; and in only a tiny handful of these would moral and political
views be found to overwhelm the sound principles of administrative law.
The fundamental charge remains to be answered: that while challenging
the arbitrary power of the decision-makers in fact Lord Denning replaced it
with the arbitrary power of the judiciary. The answer to it must be that,
while a measure of uncertainty will always exist, there is really no
acts were void not voidable (as he had held in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Head [1959]
A.C.83.
36 (1972) 70 L.G.R. 27. For another but less extreme example where Lord Denning's moral
views coloured his judgment see Cinnamond v. British Airports Authority [1980] 1 W.L.R. 582.
37 Ibid at p.30.
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convincing evidence that Lord Denning, or the judiciary as a whole, has
been systematically arbitrary in their decisions in administrative cases.38 On
the contrary, as the areas specifically chosen for discussion earlier in this
paper shows there is frequently a deep inner logic to the developments that
Lord Denning has initiated or which he has participated in. Thus the
development of the principle that for non-judicial decision-makers all
errors of law were jurisdictional is not an arbitrary principle but is founded
upon the need for consistency and the rule of law. The extension of the
rules of standing too is not arbitrary but is founded upon the rule of law not
being undermined by decisions being unchallengeable through no
challenger having standing. The protection of legitimate expectations too is
a clear extension of the obligation of fairness and not arbitrary. And the
provision of a juristic basis for the judicial review of non-statutory bodies
is a vital constitutional task precisely in order to ensure that such review is
not vulnerable to the charge that it is in breach of the rule of law. One may
disagree with the extension of judicial review implied by these
developments, but they are not arbitrary.
Moreover, Lord Denning has always accepted the supremacy of
Parliament. "The judges," he has said, "loyally obey what Parliament has
laid down.,,39Not for him the readiness to abandon our constitutional
foundations which other judges frustrated by Parliament's failure to do
what they considered necessary or fundamental have sometimes toyed with.
Judicial decisions - made by Lord Denning as well as other eminent judges
- have sometimes been unexpected, they have sometimes been in error but
they have seldom been arbitrary. They have always been justified in
reasoned and principled judgments.4o One should not confuse disagreement
with arbitrariness.4\
38 Given the complexity of the corpus of law (statute and statutory instrument as well as other
forms of regulations) that forms the machinery of government in all its manifestations, a
considerable degree of uncertainty is inherent within administrative law.
39 Speech to Justice reported in The Times 29th June, 1977. And see The Discipline of Law,
supra n.6 at pp. 8-9. To like affect see R. v. Home Secretary ex parte Hosenball [1997] 1
W.L.R. 766.
40 Cf the position in South Africa where judges towards the apartheid years often abandoned
principled justification for their pro-executive decisions. See, Forsyth, In Danger for Their
Talents (Juta & Co., 1985) at p.180. .
41 It is often suggested that because interpretation is for the judges their subservience to
Parliamentary intent is fictitious. See ''The Approach of Humpty Dumpty" cited in Young, supra
n.1 at p.1S7 from an undated Financial Times. The judges are the master of the interpretation
and so are not truly subservient. What such arguments overlook, however, is that Parliament can
speak again and speak with greater clarity. Judges may resist legislation they disapprove of, but
in the end they will (and must) submit to the democratic will. Thus unless the judges truly are
"rebels in ermine" Parliament will always have the last word.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND A SUMMING UP
It would be commonplace to remark that Lord Denning's vast influence in
the creation of modem English administrative law is a considerable
achievement. But we should not lose perspective. It was not the work of
Lord Denning alone. There were other giants of the subject whose
contribution was just as great. Lord Reid, Lord Diplock, Sir William Wade,
Professor de Smith and others - any list is bound to have omissions - made
contributions of the same order of magnitude. Perhaps Lord Denning's
style is unique. Short sentences. Vivid phrases. But Stanley de Smith's
compact style was also unique. He packed more learning into a short phrase
than many other authors put into a chapter. And Sir William is just as lucid
and his contribution continues undiminished to this day.
Lord Denning's contribution was essentially practical. In the craft of the
analysis of the decided cases he had legendary skill which at time extended
to legerdemain.42 But even more his influence rests on the clarity and
vividness of his judgments. He is a great communicator; and sometimes he
has communicated better with the public as a whole rather than those above
him in the judicial hierarchy. His dislike of jurisprudence is well known.
One consequence of this is he never articulated with any degree of
abstractness the questions of principle that underlay his judicial decisions.
One of the few disappointments of those brilliant books The Due Process
of Law and The Discipline of Law as well as the subsequent books is that
when the focus shifts from law it falls on literature or history, never on
jurisprudence or philosophy. But is this not an impractical academic's
cavil: the same comment could be made about most judges.
But these qualifications of Lord Denning's achievement all miss the
point. All great men have flaws but they remain great men. We would not
all be here today were it not for the fact that there is little doubt that on his
two hundredth birthday Lord Denning will be remembered. He will be seen
as a vital force in the revification of the public law of these islands. And his
judgments will still be read. Rather than nit-pick over this achievement we
should simply join with Lord Hailsham in his speech on Lord Denning's
retirement when he said:
"We shall miss your passion for justice, your independence
and quality of thought, your liberal mind ...and your
42 But note his views on precedent in The Discipline of Law, supra n. 6 at p.314: "All that I am
against is a too rigid application [of precedent]- a rigidity which insists that a bad precedent must
necessarily be followed. I would treat [precedent] as a path through the woods. You must follow
it certainly so as to reach your end. But you must not let the path become too overgrown. You
must cut off the dead wood and trim off the side branches."
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